Pakistan’s four-decade Afghan policy — shaped in the wake of the Soviet intervention and built around supporting a mix of Afghan, local and foreign militant groups to serve its own and Western strategic aims — appears to have come full circle.
Today, ties between the two neighbours have fractured almost entirely. The rupture recalls tensions of the 1960s, when Afghan forces pushed into Bajaur and Tirah in the Khyber tribal belt and cross-border trade was suspended. Yet the current escalation may be the most serious since 1992 in terms of direct confrontation.
Despite what seems to be a defining moment in Islamabad’s Afghan approach, sceptics continue to question whether Pakistan has a coherent long-term strategy for its western frontier.
Diplomatic breakdown
A senior Pakistani official described the present crisis as unfolding “after fully exhausting all diplomatic channels,” including extensive engagements with the Afghan Taliban authorities.
Islamabad maintains it repeatedly warned Kabul that it could no longer bear the cost of militant violence emanating from Afghan soil. The October 2025 strikes on Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) positions inside Afghanistan, officials argue, were meant to send a clear message — one they believe went unheeded.
Efforts at mediation by Qatar and Turkey following those strikes reportedly faltered when Pakistan demanded written guarantees that Afghan authorities would act against the TTP. Kabul, however, was unwilling to formalise commitments in writing, offering only verbal assurances.
A subsequent Saudi initiative also failed to gain traction. According to officials familiar with the talks, Riyadh presented a draft framework for easing tensions. Once again, the Taliban authorities declined to sign any document, limiting their pledges to verbal undertakings regarding the TTP and other militant groups.
“The problem,” one official said, “is that they want to negotiate, but they don’t deliver.”
Escalation and retaliation
Although a fragile ceasefire held for much of last year, militant attacks inside Pakistan increased sharply, straining already fragile ties. Recent assaults on Pakistani security forces triggered retaliatory strikes that Islamabad said targeted TTP hideouts along the border. The Taliban administration, however, claimed civilians were hit.
What followed surprised many observers. Taliban forces rapidly mobilised along the frontier, signalling that the confrontation risked expanding beyond limited skirmishes.
Pakistani policymakers argue they have secured regional and broader international understanding for their right to self-defence. Officials insist Islamabad’s objective is not regime change in Kabul, but curbing cross-border militancy.
“We have lost nearly 4,000 lives. How much more restraint is expected?” one official said, describing the situation as “escalation plus.”
Islamabad has also signalled that any further aggression could prompt strikes not only on militant camps but also on Taliban military installations.
Internal divisions in Kabul?
Those closely monitoring developments believe real authority lies in Kandahar, the Taliban’s spiritual and political centre. There are indications of internal differences within the Afghan leadership over how to handle the TTP issue.
Sources suggest aides to Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada have conveyed that he does not fully endorse the current approach toward Pakistani militant groups. At the same time, some factions within the Taliban reportedly see these militants as a liability, while more influential elements — particularly within the Haqqani network — are seen as holding the leverage to act decisively, should they choose to do so.
For now, Pakistani officials insist there will be no retreat. “We have crossed the Rubicon,” one said, signalling that pressure will continue until Kabul recalibrates what Islamabad views as an unsustainable policy.
Missed opportunities?
Critics of Pakistan’s Afghan policy argue that Islamabad may have miscalculated in the past. They point to the administration of former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani, which in 2019 identified the TTP as a threat in its national security framework and reportedly detained thousands of its members.
Some former officials contend that engagement with Ghani’s government might have yielded better long-term results. However, geopolitical considerations — including India’s expanding footprint in Afghanistan and tensions over Pashtun nationalism — complicated that relationship and ultimately led Pakistan to continue backing the Taliban.
With hindsight, some policymakers acknowledge alternative paths might have been possible. But they argue the current reality demands a different approach.
“The bullet has been fired,” one official remarked. “Now the pressure must remain until the Taliban reconsider.”